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ENERGY FACILITY SITING: RECENT MODELS
OF REFORM
There is a growing recognition of both the scope and the magnitude of
this nation's energy problem. 1 The nation's recognition -of the need to
protect the environment defines the boundaries within which an acceptable solution to this problem may be found. 2 The Reagan Administration
has reaffirmed the commitment of the previous administration to increasing domestic energy production and to reducing the nation's dependence
on foreign oil. Although the details of the Reagan energy program are still
developing, it is clear that the new administration has placed a high priority on solving the energy problem. Less clear, however, is what impact
the commitment to stimulating domestic energy production will have on
the nation's prior commitment to environmental protection.
Increasing domestic energy production necessitates the building of new
energy production plants and the decision to allow construction of a major
energy facility requires a compromise between protecting the environment and satisfying the nation's energy needs. 3 One way to expedite construction of domestic energy facilities is to eliminate the bureaucratic and
regulatory red tape. that impedes the development of energy projects.
Two proposals have merged as methods of overcoming the hurdles in the
4
siting process posed by red tape and delay. The first, fast-track siting,
was advocated by the Carter Administration. The second, one-stop siting,5 is currently utilized by a number of states.
This comment first defines the energy-environment dilemma which
frames the issues of energy facility siting. The comment then compares
and evaluates the relative strengths and weaknesses of fast-track siting
1. A recent article aptly characterized the energy crisis as an "Everything Crisis." TIME, December 22, 1980, at 54.
2. Broad statements of the nation's policy toward the environment are contained in the National

Environmental Policy Act of 1969:
The purposes of this [Act] are: To declare a national policy which will encourage productive and
enjoyable harmony between man and his environment; to promote efforts which will prevent or
eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man;
to enrich the understanding of the ecological systems and natural resources important to the
Nation ....
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, §2, 42 U.S.C. §4321 (1976).
3. See notes 13-16 and accompanying text infra.
4. "Fast-track" siting refers to a siting process in which selected energy projects are placed on
an expedited schedule, a "fast-track," through normal siting procedures to speed their completion.
See section H A infra.
5. "One-stop" siting is a siting process in which a single administrative body evaluates all aspects of an energy project and exercises final authority to approve or deny the project. See section II B
infra.
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and one-stop siting. The comment concludes that, in an effort to expedite
the siting process and to increase domestic energy production, the Reagan
Administration should adopt a federal policy favoring one-stop siting.
I.

BACKGROUND: THE ENERGY-ENVIRONMENT
DILEMMA

Regardless of the study selected, there is a consensus that national energy demands will increase. 6 The high standard of living enjoyed by most
Americans corresponds with a high level of energy consumption. 7 Skyrocketing gasoline and home fuel costs 8 have made Americans fully
aware of the central role that energy plays in their lives. The fundamental
importance of energy to a modem society makes it unreasonable to assume that the government will permit energy needs to go unmet. Consequently, the only questions which remain to be answered are how much
energy needs will increase and how those needs will be met.
How the nation will meet its future energy needs will be influenced
significantly by the dramatic increase in environmental awareness that has
taken place within the past fifteen years. The planning of energy policy no
longer revolves solely around considerations of demand. 9 Energy issues
6. Before 1973, energy studies consistently projected that the total U.S. energy demand would
more than double by the end of the century. Recently, unreliable foreign oil supplies and resulting
shortages have forced a serious reconsideration of America's energy future. Emphasizing both energy
efficiency and energy conservation, a recent report estimates that the nation can limit the increase in
total energy demand to approximately 10-15 percent by the year 2000. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY, THE GOOD NEws ABOUT ENERGY vi-viii (1979). See generally COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMEN.
TAL QUALITY, OTH ANNUAL REPORT 315-30 (1979); Six-Year Review of Energy by the Harvard
University School of Business:HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Energy Conservationand Supply of
the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); Shortages of
Gasoline, Heating Oil and Diesel Fuel: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy Regulation of the
Senate Comm. on Energy and NaturalResources, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979).
7. Energy provides the technological foundation of modem societies. Willrich, The Energy-Environment Conflict: Siting ElectricPower Facilities,58 VA. L. REV. 257, 261 (1972). See generally
COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT:

ELECTRIC POWER 1-5

(1973); COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, 10TH ANNUAL REPORT 315 (1979).
8. Between January 1978 and March 1979, the national average of motor gasoline prices increased approximately 18.5 percent and the national average of residential heating oil prices increased approximately 21 percent. Shortages of Gasoline, Heating Oil, and Diesel Fuel: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Energy Regulation of the Senate Comm. on Energy and NaturalResources,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. 160-62 (1979).
9. See, e.g., Washington Energy Facility Site and Evaluation Act:
It is the intent [of the legislature] to seek courses of action that will balance the increasing
demands for energy facility location and operation in conjunction with the broad interests of the
public. Such action will be based on these premises:
(1) To assure Washington state citizens that, where applicable, operational safeguards are at
least as stringent as the criteria established by the federal government and are technically sufficient for their welfare and protection.
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now must be formulated in conjunction with national environmental policies. The production of energy and the protection of the environment,
however, present two competing policies. 10 Underlying the energy-environment conflict are two axioms. First, the nation's increasing energy
needs must be met. 1 Second, the production of power to meet those energy needs will have an adverse impact on the environment. 12 The decision whether to proceed with a proposed facility, therefore, requires an
inevitable compromise of either energy values or environmental values. 13
The federal government and state governments have passed numerous
environmental protection laws. 14 Permit requirements and application
procedures can ensure that all energy facility siting decisions consider environmental values. 15 The existing environmental controls represent leg(2) To preserve and protect the quality of the environment; to enhance the public's opportunity to enjoy the esthetic and recreational benefits of the air, water and land resources; to promote air cleanliness; and to pursue beneficial changes in the environment.
(3) To provide abundant energy at reasonable cost.
WASH. REV. CODE §80.50.010 (1979). See also Luce, PowerforTomorrow: The Siting Dilemma, 25
REc. ASs'N BAR CITY N.Y. 13, 25 (1970); Comment, IndustrialSite Selection: Existing Institutions
and ProposalsforReform,55 NEB. L. REV. 440 (1976).
10. The absolute protection of the environment is unreasonable if the nation is to continue generating power to meet its energy needs. Willrich, supra note 7, at 259, 303. See Lippek, Power and the
Environment: A Statutory Approach to Electric Facility Siting, 47 WASH. L. REV. 35, 63 (1978);
Comment, California'sEnergy Commission: Illusions of a One-Stop Power Plant Siting Agency, 24
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1313 (1977). See also Murray & Seneker, IndustrialSiting:Allocating the Burden
ofPollution, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 301,302 (1978).
11. Case & Schoenbrod, Electricity or the Environment: A Study of Public Regulation Without
Public Control, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 961,963-64 (1973);-Rodgers, Siting Power Plantsin Washington
State, 47 WASH. L. REV. 9, 14 (1972); Tarlock, Tippy & Francis, Environmental Regulation of
Power PlantSiting: Existing and ProposedInstitutions, 45 So. CAL. L. REV. 502, 503 (1972). See
also Murray & Seneker, supra note 10, at 302.
12. The development of various fuel sources has been characterized as a choice between "competing brands of environmental destruction." Lippek, supra note 10, at 36. The environmental effects of energy production include thermal discharge, air pollution, and landscape blight. Id. See
Tarlock, Tippy & Francis, supranote 11, at 507-13; CouNcu ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALrrY, ENERGY
ADTHE ENVIRONMNTm: ELECTRIC PowER 9-11 (1973).
13. A compromise of either environmental protection or energy production is inevitable in the
absence of an environmentally neutral source of energy. See Lippek, supra note 10, at 63; Willrich,
supra note 7, at 303; Comment, supranote 10, at 1313. See also Murray & Seneker, supra note 10,

at 302.
14. See, e.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976); National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361 (1976); Washington State Environmental Policy Act of 1971, WASH. REV. CODE §§ 43.21C.010-.910 (1979); California Environmental
Quality Act, CAL. Pua. RES. CODE §§ 21000-21175 (West 1971 & Supp. 1980). See generally W.
RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 697-834 (1977).
15. The House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs compiled a list of the types of federal
laws and permits that could pertain to the construction of a synfuels plant to illustrate procedural
problems which confront a major energy facility. The committee found twelve federal laws which
required the issuance of permits and ten federal laws which would potentially apply to the project, but
do not require permits. H.R. REP. No. 410, Part 1, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 5-9 (1979). See, e.g., S.
REP. No. 331, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 20-24 (1979).
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islative efforts to strike a politically acceptable balance between the environment and energy. Since many of the environmental regulations were
drafted incrementally and were framed for specific needs, current regulations are sometimes redundant and often marked by fragmented procedures. 16 The responsibility for monitoring compliance with environmental regulations has been diffused among numerous governmental
agencies. Consequently, agencies with limited jurisdiction over environmental issues have been created and they have tended to develop vested
interests in protecting one resource or serving a limited constituency. 17
Representatives of the energy industry and legal commentators have
criticized the complex maze of environmental permits and procedures. 18
The energy industry argues that fragmented permit procedures result in
unnecessary delays which translate into increased costs. 19 Legal commentators, on the other hand, find fault with the lack of coordination in
the permit issuing process. 20 From an environmental perspective, the
fragmented procedures, combined with the limited jurisdiction of regulatory agencies, militate against a complete balancing of environmental
2
concerns by individual agencies in their decisions. 1
There is nothing which mandates that environmental concerns have
precedence over other pressing national concerns, or vice versa. Ulti16. Fragmentation occurs as a result of regulations which are designed to meet specific problems.
The regulatory agencies promulgating these regulations, although functionally related, are often organizationally separate. Consequently, inter-agency lines of communication are significantly reduced
causing repetition and overlap. COLORADO DEP'T OF NATURAL RESOURCES, DRAFT MANUAL: COLORADO'S JOINT REVIEW PROCESS FOR MAJOR AND MINERAL RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS 3(1980);
Case & Schoenbrod, supra note 11, at 965; Tarlock, Tippy & Francis, supra note 11, at 556; Comment, Energy FacilitySiting in Oregon: Towards RegulatoryEffectiveness, 58 OR. L. REV. 220, 223
(1979). See also Murray & Seneker, supra note 10, at 303-06.
17. Murray & Seneker, supra note 10, at 305. See generally COLORADO DEPT OF NATURAL RESOURCES, supra note 16, at 2; Luce, supra note 9, at 13; Van Baalen, IndustrialSiting Legislation:
The Wyoming IndustrialDevelopment Information and Siting Act-Advance or Retreat? I I LAND &
WATER L. REV. 27, 29 (1976).
18. See F. BOSSELMAN, D. FEURER & C. SIEMON, THE PERMIT EXPLOSION: COORDINATION OFTHE
PROLIFERATION (1976); Van Baalen, supranote 17, at 28-29; Willich, supra note 7, at 259. See also
Murray & Seneker, supra note 10, at 318.
19. Delay is manifested in three types of costs: the costs of replacing energy expected to be
produced by the delayed project, the inflated costs of construction after delay, and the costs of carrying charges on capital already expended on the project. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, DELAYS IN
NUCLEAR REACTOR LICENSING AND CONSTRUCTION: THE POSSIBILITIES FOR REFORM 28-29 (1979);
Willrich, supra note 7, at 270-7 1.
20. COLORADO DEP'T OF NATURAL RESOURCES, supra note 16, at 2; Van Baalen, supra note 17, at
29. Although environmentalists have expressed concern about fragmented procedures, the possibility
of delaying or stopping a project increases with the number of opportunities for hearings and permits.
Accordingly, project opponents may find the maze of permits strategically advantageous in their opposition to an energy project. Lippek, supra note 10, at 48; Rodgers, supra note 11, at 20.
21. COLORADO DEP'T OF NATURAL RESOURCES, supra note 16, at 2-4; Luce, supra note 9, at 23;
Van Baalen, supranote 17, at 29.
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mately, the choices to be made between energy and the environment are
political. The political climate as well as the energy needs of the nation
will, as a result, play a role in dictating what choices will be made. One
commentator has characterized the nation as being in the midst of two
simultaneous crises: an energy crisis and an environmental crisis.22 Recent developments 23 in the Middle East have given a new urgency to the
resolution of the conflicting interests in energy and the environment. Concerns for national defense and economic security 24 increase pressure to
boost domestic energy production. Unfortunately, nothing has reduced
the adverse environmental impact accompanying energy production. Energy programs, therefore, must continue to be carefully drafted in light of
environmental consequences regardless of the temptation to focus solely
upon the exigencies of domestic energy production.
II.

MODELS OF REFORM

Increasing speed and efficiency in the power plant siting process by
reforming the siting institution is not a novel concept. Efforts to reform
the siting process have focused on creating both a rational and an expeditious procedure. Two common methods of reform have been referred to
as the fast-track approach and the one-stop approach. Both approaches
are intended to alleviate the burdens of multiple licensing and both share
certain features. First, both share the immediate goal of expediting the
energy facility permitting process. Second, both proposals attempt to
eliminate unnecessary procedural delay by the creation of a single agency
with the power to consolidate and coordinate the activities of the concerned regulatory agencies. A comparison of the two models reveals significant differences that have important implications for their value as
models for siting reform.
A.

Fast-TrackSiting

One of the models that has been developed in an effort to accommodate
both energy and environmental interests is the fast-track siting model.
The model provides for the identification of priority energy projects and
22. Willrich, supra note 7, at 259.
23. The Iran-Iraq conflict, begun in September 1980, threatened to disrupt major oil supply shipping lanes. The conflict underscores the increasingly unpredictable and volatile political climate of a
region relied upon by a majority of Western nations for the bulk of their energy supplies.
24, See generally CABINET TASK FORCE ON OIt, IMPORT CONTROL, THE OIL IMPORT QUESTION- A
REPORT ON THE RELATIONSHIP OF OIL IMPORTS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY (1970); S. REP. No. 331,
96th Cong., lst Sess, 18 (1979).
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the placement of such projects on a fast track through the normal siting
process. The fast track is carved out of existing siting procedures by either accelerating the decision-making process or reducing the number of
decisions to be made, or both. The siting process remains intact to the
extent that only specified projects are expedited through the process.
Non-priority energy projects are still subject to the normal siting procedures.
An example of a plan to implement such a model was found in the
Carter Administration's energy program proposal. 2 5 The proposal focused on expediting the energy facility siting process as a means of stimulating domestic energy production. 26 A new agency, the Energy Mobilization Board (EMB), 2 7 was designed to accelerate the development of
domestic energy resources by modifying or eliminating procedural
impediments to the construction of selected non-nuclear energy facilities.
Proponents expected the new agency to foster coordination and integration of federal, state, and local procedures necessary for the approval of
energy facilities. 28

25. The Carter proposal evolved into the Priority Energy Project Act of 1979. Guidelines for
legislation establishing an Energy Mobilization Board were issued by the White House in a memorandum sent to Congress. Specifications for Establishment of Operations of an Energy Mobilization
Board (July 19, 1979) (copy on file at the Washington Law Review). The Senate and the House of
Representatives each passed a statute providing for a version of the Energy Mobilization Board. See
S. 1308, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 125 CONG. REC. S14,058 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1979); H.R. 4985, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. H9993 (daily ed. Oct. 31, 1979). The bill was reported out of
conference committee on June 21, 1980. H.R. REP. No. 1119, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). The
conference bill was defeated in the House on June 27, 1980 and was subsequently referred back to
conference committee where it died. 126 CONG. REC. H5796 (daily ed. June 27, 1980).
The bill was a legislative response to the myriad of laws that must be complied with before the
construction of a major energy facility. There are approximately 23 federal laws or executive orders
which apply to major energy projects. The Department of Energy has found 54 federal laws related to
at-home energy development and conservation. 125 CONG. REC. H9987 (daily ed. Oct. 31, 1979)
(remarks of Rep. Broyhill); 125 CONG. REC. H9979 (daily ed. Oct. 31, 1979) (remarks of Rep.
Corcoran).
26. S. 1308, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2, 125 CONG. REC. S14,054 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1979).
27. The Board would have consisted of four members to be appointed by the President under the
Senate version and five members under the House version. S. 1308, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(b)(l),
125 CONG. REC. S14,055 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1979); H.R. 4985, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 174(a), 125
CONG. REc. H9993 (daily ed. Oct. 31, 1979). A proposed budget provided for, in addition to the
Board members, the positions of general counsel, executive director, and a staff of 50. H.R. REP.
No. 410, Part 2, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 38 (1979).
28. S. 1308, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(b)(1), 125 CONG. REC. S14,054 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1979);
COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, THE PRESIDENT'S ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAM 2 (1979). This
approach implicitly suggested that Congress perceived a combination of procedural technicalities and
repetitious procedures as the major obstacles to domestic energy development. Congress expressly
rejected the alternative case-by-case solution of exempting energy projects from permit requirements
by special legislation. The House Committee reasoned that special legislation normally is enacted
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As a means of implementing fast-track siting, the EMB would have
been empowered to designate priority energy projects, to promulgate
project decision schedules, and to preempt any other agency that failed to
comply with the decision schedule set by the EMB. Any persons planning
or constructing a non-nuclear 29 energy facility could have applied to the
EMB for designation of their project as a priority energy project. 30 If the
project received priority status, the EMB would then have established a
project decision schedule for the completion of the project. 3 1 To assist in
the promulgation of expeditious decision schedules, the proposal would
have allowed the EMB to recommend the waiver of certain federal, state,
and local requirements on a project-by-project basis, 32 thereby reducing
the number of decisions as well as the time required to complete a decision schedule. In the event that any of the concerned agencies failed to
meet a decision schedule deadline, the EMB could have either stepped in
and made the decision according to applicable law 33 or sought a court
34
order to force an agency decision.
only after bureaucratic delays have occurred and completion of the project is threatened. In contrast,
the EMB theoretically provides a more desirable solution because it prevents delays and ensures that
timely decisions are made in a coordinated manner. H.R. REP. No. 410, Part 2, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
13 (1979).
29. S. 1308, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(b)(1), 125 CONG. REc. S14,054 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1979).
30. A priority status would have been granted to those projects that would reduce, directly or
indirectly, the nation's dependence on foreign oil. The designation of a priority energy project would
have required the concurrence of the chairperson and at least two of three board members. The Act
also would have required that the decision be made within 60 days of receipt of the designation
request. Id. § 11, 125 CONG. REc. S 14,058 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1979).
31. A project decision schedule would have set deadlines for any agency decision or action necessary to the completion and initial operation of a project. The decision schedule would have identified what decisions or actions must be made by a particular agency as well as the order in which they
must be made. The Act also would have required federal, state, and local agencies to adopt special,
expedited procedures to meet the schedules set by the EMB. The decision schedule could have required the agencies to render decisions in a shorter period of time than required under current laws.
Id. §§ 17, 19, 125 CONG. Rc. S14,058 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1979).
32. Both the bill passed by the Senate and the bill passed by the House would have granted
waiver powers to the EMB. Under the Senate bill, the Board would have been empowered to waive
procedural requirements of existing law. Id. The House bill, on the other hand, would have empowered the Board to waive substantive requirements of existing law. H.R. 4985, 96th Cong., Ist
Sess. § 185, 125 CoNG. REc. H9995 (daily ed. Oct. 31, 1979).
33. The power to preempt agencies which did not comply with their project decision schedules
was proposed in the original White House guidelines sent to Congress and provided for in the Senate
version of the bill. White House memorandum, supra note 25, at § VII; S. 1308, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 21, 125 CONG. RFC. S14,059 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1979). The Senate bill required that, if
necessary, the Board develop an adequate record before rendering a decision in lieu of a preempted
agency. Id.
34. Id. § 21(b)(1), 125 CONG. Rc. S14,059 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1979); H.R. 4985, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. § 183, 125 CONG. REc. H9995 (daily ed. Oct. 31, 1979). Judicial review of priority projects
would have been streamlined under both versions of the bill. The Senate version lodged exclusive
jurisdiction over the review of actions of both the fast-track siting agency and the other concerned
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One-Stop Siting

Many states have enacted legislation designed to ease or to coordinate
energy facility siting. A number have adopted a one-stop siting process to
expedite the various agency proceedings that otherwise are required to
site an energy facility. 35 The concept arose in response to a recognition by
states that existing siting procedures were assuming byzantine complexity
and imposing oppressive burdens on the energy industry. The one-stop

concept attempts to remedy the problem by allowing a single administrative body to consider and to decide all issues relating to the construction

and operation of an energy facility.
Conceptually, the one-stop process is simple. 36 A siting council is cre-

ated to evaluate all aspects of a proposed energy facility. 37 Proponents of
a project submit a single application to the council3 8 which, in turn, is
authorized to certify a project by issuing a single permit. 39 Certification

by the council preempts all permit requirements of other regulatory agencies. 40 An energy project, therefore, is subjected only to those require-

agencies with the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals. S. 1308, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. §
27(a)(1), 125 CONG. REc. S 14,060 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1979). In addition, the Senate bill attempted to
limit the reviewing court's deliberation period. Id. §27(b), 125 CONG. REC. S 14,060 (daily ed. Oct.
4, 1979). The House version limited the availability of judicial review by shielding both the designation of priority projects and the setting of decision schedules from judicial review. H.R. 4985, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 187, 125 CONG. REC. H9996 (daily ed. Oct. 31, 1979). Regarding the constitutionality of limitations on judicial review of agency action, see Library of Congress Congressional
Research Service, Limitations on Judicial Review of Agency Action (July 6, 1979).
35. At least 22 states have enacted energy facility siting legislation. For a listing of state statutes,
see Murray & Seneker, supra note 10, at 303 n. 12. Eighteen of those states have followed a one-stop
approach. See Granger & Wise, A Critique of One-Stop Siting in Washington: Streamlining Review
Without Compromising Effectiveness, 10 ENVT'L LAW 457 (1980). See, e.g., Energy Facility Site and
Evaluation Act, WASH. REV. CODE §§ 80.50.010-.902 (1979); Public Utility Environmental Standards Act, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §3 16-50g to-50z (West Supp. 1981); Power Plant Siting Act of
1974, Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 278.020-.027 (Baldwin 1979).
36. The numerous state versions of the one-stop process prevent the singling out of a definitive
model. The Washington version, however, was the prototype for many of the states and exhibits all of
the characteristics of the one-stop process and will be used for illustrative purposes. See WASH. REV.
CODE 33 80.50.010-.902 (1979).
37. The siting council primarily consists of representatives from regulatory agencies who would
otherwise have permitting responsibilities. Membership on the council, however, should be extended
to include all pertinent agencies and not just those with permitting authority. E.g., WASH. REV. CODE
§ 80.50.030 (1979).
38. See Murray & Seneker, supra note 10, at 330-31. See, e.g., WASH. ADMIN. CODE 33 46342-010 to -620 (1977).
39. See Van Baalen, supra note 17, at 29. See, e.g., WASH. REv. CODE 33 80.50.100-.110
(1979).
40. Rodgers, supra note 11, at 20; Tarlock, Tippy & Francis, supra note 11, at 555-56; Van
Baalen, supranote 17, at 30.
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ments and conditions mandated by the council, 4 1 rather than to a number
of redundant, and possibly contradictory, requirements imposed by various separate agencies.
The siting council coordinates 42 the various regulatory agencies by
eliminating administrative redundancies. 43 The one-stop process simultaneously preserves the expertise of the individual regulatory agencies
and produces a streamlined method for all interested agencies to evaluate
a proposed energy facility. 44 As a result, the one-stop agency provides a
unified forum where the range of environmental, social, economic, and
energy issues raised by the construction of an energy facility can be examined in a single permitting procedure. The council, therefore, should
reach an integrated decision after considering special interests, parochial
45
departmental interests, and the composite needs of society.
It is essential, if one-stop siting is to accomplish its objectives, that
both the energy industry and environmentalists be willing to make compromises. The compromise that the one-stop concept demands between
the energy industry and environmentalists may be viewed as a trade-off of
due process rights. Through the exercise of their due process right to be
heard, environmentalists have the power to transform each step of the
permitting process into an opportunity to thwart or delay a project. From
the energy industry's point of view, the closer to the completion of a project such due process rights are exercised, the greater the threatened capital investment loss. Accordingly, environmentalists have been offered a
more comprehensive opportunity to be heard earlier in the planning and
construction stages. In exchange for more due process rights 46 in the earlier stages of a project, the environmentalists are deprived of their oppor41. Rodgers, supra note 11, at 20; Tarlock, Tippy & Francis, supranote 11, at 555-56; Van
Baalen, supranote 17, at 30.
42. Commentators have noted that preemptory power by the siting council is unnecessary to the
effective use of the one-stop concept and that such power creates the potential for using the siting
council as a tool to dismantle environmental regulations. Accompanying preemptory power is the
threat that a "power crisis of the future might stampede [the authorization of plants] without the usual
pollution control features," and thereby provide a ready shield from environmental regulations for
the energy industry. Rodgers, supra note 11, at 22. Consequently, each regulatory agency should
retain and exercise "its existing statutory powers to prescribe conditions for-and perhaps to veto-"
a proposed energy project within the framework of the siting council. Id. at 23. See also Tarlock,
Tippy & Francis, supra note I, at 555.
43. Van Baalen, supranote 17, at 30.
44. Tarlock, Tippy & Francis, supranote 11, at 556; Van Baalen, supranote 17, at 30.
45. Rodgers, supranote 11, at 23-24.
46. The enhanced due process rights acquired by environmentaliststake a variety of forms, including: the provision for independent consultants to collect the requisite scientific data; the appointment of a counsel for the environment during the one-stop proceedings; and the substitution of adjudicative-type hearings for legislative-type hearings. See, e.g., WAsH. REV. CODE §§ 80.50.071, .080,

.090(3) (1979).
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tunity to be heard once a project is under construction. By granting earlier, expanded due process rights to environmentalists and by eliminating
the gauntlet of permits faced by the energy industry, the one-stop concept
offers both an efficient decision-making process and a reasonable compromise between the conflicting values of energy and the environment.
III.

FAST-TRACK AND ONE-STOP SITING: A COMPARISON
AND EVALUATION

To respond to the energy crisis, the Reagan Administration must formulate an energy policy and create proposals to implement that policy.
Expediting the siting process while maintaining the ability to balance energy and environmental considerations will be an important challenge to
the policymakers. An analysis of fast-track and one-stop proposals provides an opportunity to examine whether the existing requirements of the
siting process have raised an unnecessary and insurmountable barrier to
the development of domestic energy resources.
The primary strength of fast-track siting is the creation of an alternative
expedited siting procedure available to a number of selected energy projects. The creation of an expedited process with can coordinate and facilitate siting requirements is praiseworthy. Fast-track siting's strength,
however, is also its weakness. By creating an alternative siting procedure
for selected projects, fast-track siting implicitly recognizes the existence
of shortcomings in the current siting process and, more importantly, suggests the expendability of existing procedures. The approach, nonetheless, eschews any attempt to grapple with the presumably expendable siting procedures applicable to non-priority projects.
The one-stop process defuses criticism of the permitting process made
by both energy industry representatives and by environmentalists. First,
substitution of a single certification for multiple permits frees the energy
industry from the burdens and the hazards of a fragmented permitting process. 47 Second, a single evaluation that fully considers all of the interrelated issues provides a more appropriate framework for considering environmental interests. 48 A major limitation of the one-stop concept is that it
presumes the necessity and value of existing permit requirements. Efficiency is improved and delay reduced, but only to the extent achievable
through increased coordination. In short, the one-stop approach does not
provide for the elimination of siting requirements which may be spurious.
Although they bear a superficial resemblance, the fast-track and the
47.
48.

See note 16 and accompanying text supra.
See note 21 and accompanying text supra.
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one-stop concepts differ significantly in their ends. A comparison of administrative structures reveals very different long-range goals. The major
purposes of a one-stop agency are to simplify and to expedite the permitting process. In contrast, expediting the permitting process is only a
means of achieving a fast-track agency's long-range goal. Unlike onestop siting, fast-track siting was conceived and proposed within the context of a perceived threat to national security49 so its primary administrative mission was to boost the constructionof domestic energy plants. 50
The means employed by fast-track siting also differ significantly from
those advocated by the one-stop concept. The one-stop concept is designed to shorten the permitting period by coordinating the requirements
of various agencies into a centralized procedure. The powers of a onestop agency are limited to those of coordination. 5 1 The fast-track agency
as proposed by President Carter, however, was vested with wide-ranging
powers of waiver 52 and preemption 53 and could eliminate permit requirements to accelerate the permitting process.
The departure of the fast-track concept in both ends and means from
the one-stop concept has two major implications. First, the administrative
momentum toward energy facility construction makes an impartial exercise of the fast-track agency's broad powers improbable. Consequently,
the EMB's administrative orientation as expeditor of energy project construction would likely have influenced all EMB decisions. Second, the
initial determination whether to fast-track an energy project would be the
most crucial. The significance of granting priority status to a proposed
energy project lies in the pervasive influence such decisions would have
on the subsequent exercise of the fast-track agency's waiver and preemption powers.
In determining which licensing procedures create unnecessary delay
and are therefore waivable, a fast-track siting agency would be required
to engage in a balancing of the costs and benefits of a required procedure. 54 The decision to fast-track a project-a decision which implicitly
49. S. REP. No. 331, 96thCong., 1stSess. 18 (1979);S. 1308, 96thCong., IstSess. §2(a), 125
CONG. REc. S 14,054 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1979).

50. See, e.g., 125 CONG. REc. S 13,858 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1979) (remarks of Sen. Jackson).
51. Powers which extend beyond those of coordination are superfluous to the one-stop agency's
ability to effectively discharge its responsibilities. Accordingly, the power of a one-stop agency
should be limited to that of coordination and not, for example, extended to include preemption. See
note 42 supra.
52. See note 32 and accompanying text supra.
53. See note 33 and accompanying text supra.
54. The EMB would have had to make decisions that, by nature, necessitate a balancing of competing interests. It would have been difficult, if not impossible, for Congress to have established any
meaningful criteria to guide the EMB in its weighing of the quantitative and qualitative evidence.
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recognizes the beneficial value of the particular project-is likely to influence the balancing process in favor of construction. A predisposition
toward the beneficial value of an energy project will inevitably affect how
a siting agency perceives the costs and benefits 55 of a permit requirement.
A biased exercise of waiver power by the agency, in turn, creates a
threat that it can shape the decisions made by federal, state, and local
agencies. Accompanying the power to dictate procedures is the power to
influence the ultimate decision of the agency. 56 Under the Carter fasttrack proposal, a significant portion of siting decisions would have been
made by the EMB, directly or indirectly, because of the pressures it
would have been able to exert on the decisions of permitting agencies.
Similarly, a fast-track siting agency's decision to award priority status
would affect the use of its preemption power. The EMB, for example,
would have been able to preempt an agency which had failed to meet its
decision schedule. 57 Little chance exists that a fast-track agency, already
convinced of the necessity of a project, would render a decision contrary
to its prior judgment and adverse to the project. The proponents of a project would be pleading their case a second time before an agency already
persuaded of the project's value.
The powers of waiver and preemption present in the Carter fast-track
model thus extend beyond the authority necessary to remedy problems of
fragmentation and redundancy in the siting process. Such powers threaten
any potential benefit to be gained from the fast-track approach as a coordinating mechanism and risk losing the valuable contributions and expertise of both local and federal agencies. 58 Fast-track siting, as such,
55. With the goal of energy plant construction in mind, it is submitted that the "costs" of a
permitting requirement can be identified as the amount of time delay produced by the requirement
relative to the necessity of the project. Conversely, the "benefits" represent the environmental and
health safeguards provided by a permit requirement relative to the potential dangers posed by a project. As the value of a project rises, the amount of time delay becomes increasingly important, thereby
raising the "cost" of a permit requirement. Likewise, a confidence in the value of a project will result
in the safeguards appearing to provide fewer "benefits" than if a project's worth or value were in
question.
56. There is continuing controversy as to whether substantive administrative decisions are, in
fact, influenced by a modification of administrative procedures. The National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361 (1976), has provided a forum for debate over this
issue. Compare Wichelman, Administrative Agency Implementation of the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969: A Conceptual Framework for Explaining Differential Response, 16 NAT. RESOURCES J. 263, 279-86 (1976) (the procedural requirements of NEPA have resulted in gradual substantive changes in agency decisionmaking) with Comment, Implementation of the Environmental
Impact Statement, 88 YALE L.J. 596 (1979) (a purely procedural response is inadequate to implement
the goals of NEPA).
57. See note 33 and accompanying text supra.
58. Those agencies which have been preempted or whose permitting functions have been waived
can no longer contribute to the siting process. See Rodgers, supra note 11,at 23-24; Tarlock, Tippy
& Francis, supra note 11,at 554-56.

478

Energy Facility Siting
creates an atmosphere in which the ability of the siting process to accommodate environmental concerns is brought into question and the integrity
of the process is subject to challenge.
The prescription of an effective remedy depends upon an accurate diagnosis of the problem. Because of the corresponding trade-off in environmental quality, it is especially important that actions taken to increase
energy production be informed decisions. Accordingly, an analysis of the
fast-track model must include an evaluation of the premises which underlie the fast-track concept.
Three premises underlie the fast-track approach: 59 First, that the immediate construction of various energy facilities will provide the most effective solution to the energy problem; second, that environmental protection statutes represent the major source of delay in energy facility
construction; third, that licensing statutes and procedures in their current
form are expendable. The validity of these premises cannot withstand
scrutiny.
Accelerating all domestic energy project construction guarantees neither the most effective nor the fastest method of solving the nation's energy problem. It is a mistake to equate the rapid construction of energy
facilities with the efficient development of energy resources. Careful
planning, rather than speed, achieves efficient and economical energy development. The fast-track approach accelerates only those projects which
have been proposed by the energy industry. 6° Nothing assures that the
energy industry proposals will promote the efficient and socially cost-effective development of finite resources. Although the proposed fast-track
legislation guaranteed action, it failed to guarantee that the most efficient
and cost-effective steps would be taken to solve the energy problem.
Environmental procedures are a source of delay in the construction of
energy facilities. To suggest that they are the major source of delay, however, is unwarranted. First, studies which have examined energy facility
construction have concluded that environmental statutes merely contrib-

59. See Duerksen, Energy Haste May Make Political,EcologicalWaste, CONSERVATION FOUNDAMON LETrr R (Oct. 1979).
60. Commentators have argued that a fundamental shortcoming of current energy policy is that
private industry remains in control of major policy decisions such as the types of energy researched
and promoted as well as the designing of energy plants. Energy industry decisions are motivated
more often by considerations of "internal business accounting and overall industry efficiency [than
by] the external socioeconomic benefits and detriments of individual siting decisions, or... their
cumulative impacts on the surrounding economy." Hamilton, Power Plant Siting: A LiteratureReview, 19 NAT. REoURcEs J. 75, 95 (1979). See also Rodgers, supranote 11, at 32; Tarlock, Tippy &
Francis, supranote 11, at 561; Comment, supra note 10, at 1315 n.8.
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ute to the overall delay of a project. 6 1 Other delays include labor disputes,
62
project planning, availability of materials, and availability of financing.
Second, new Council on Environmental Quality guidelines promise to expedite the time-consuming Environmental Impact Satement process by
63
streamlining existing procedures.
Implicit in the Carter Administration's decision to grant a fast-track
agency power to waive procedural laws was the suggestion that current
procedures are expendable. No evidence warrants the assumption that the
procedures responsible for delay failed to provide better decisions. 64 Opponents of the EMB, for example, pointed to the exemption of the Alaska
pipeline from licensing laws as evidence of the importance of environ61. Reviewing a study conducted by the Library of Congress which examined six energy facility
case histories, Senator Stafford noted:
Despite their readily apparent differences a review of the case studies points to two basic
conclusions: First, that it is difficult to attribute the delay or foreclosure of construction of energy development facilities solely to substantive Federal environmental protection laws; and
second, that usually it appears that a general lack of consensus on the need for the project, at
least as proposed, underlies the difficulty promoters of the projects have faced in trying to obtain
necessary regulatory approvals.
125 CONG. REC. S13,876 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1979) (remarks of Sen. Stafford).
62. A recent study conducted by the Congressional Budget Office illustrates the types of delays
which may occur in the licensing and construction of nuclear reactors. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, DELAYS IN NUCLEAR REACTOR LICENSING AND CONSTRUCTION: THE POSSIBILITIES FOR REFORM
(1979). Although the study deals only with nuclear power plants, a majority of the delay factors are
common to all power plants. Delays in the reactor lead time occur in two phases: the licensing phase
and the construction phase. Id. at 11-17. Sources of delay during the licensing phase are primarily
limited to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) safety report analysis and environmental
report. Id. at 19-22. The longest delays in reactor lead time occur after the issuance of a construction
permit, when the reactor is under construction. Id. at 23. Approximately 80 percent of the total
amount of delay reported for reactors under construction occurred because of events or decisions in
the private sector unrelated to the NRC. Id. More specifically, the two largest sources of construction
delay are the reconsideration of future energy demand and financial delays. Id. See also Case &
Schoenbrod, supra note I I, at 997-99; Willrich, supra note 7, at 271.
63. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500-1508 (1980). The new regulations, effective July 30, 1979, id. §
1506.12, were promulgated pursuant to President Carter's 1977 order for the Council to issue regulations, replacing prior guidelines, to implement more effectively the procedural requirements of
NEPA. Exec. Order No. 11,991, 3 C.F.R. 123 (1978). "In pursuit of [improving agency decisions
by reforming the decision-making process], the regulations ease compliance with NEPA by clarifying
procedures, reducing paperwork, and minimizing delay." Fisher, The CEQ Regulations: New Stage
in the Evolution of NEPA, 3 HARV. ENVT'L L. REV. 347, 348 (1979). See COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, IOTH ANNUAL REPORT, 577-81 (1979); Comment, Implementation of the Environmental Impact Statement, 88 YALE L.J. 596 (1979). See generally COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS (1976); General Accounting Office, The Environmental

Impact Statement-It Seldom Causes Long Project Delays But Could Be More Useful If Prepared
Earlier (1977).
64. "[T]here may be good reason for delaying project decisions in the course of the EIS process.
If a proposed action is complicated, the NEPA requirements for a careful look at consequences and
for thoughtful analysis of public and agency comments help agencies to reach an informed decision."
COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS 27 (1976). "A number
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mental procedures. 65 They argued that had proper consideration been
given to all the impacts and the available alternatives, the subsequent unexpected glut of Alaskan oil on the West Coast would have been
66
avoided.
The shortcomings of the EMB should remind the Reagan Administration that the formulation of an effective program to stimulate domestic
energy production is dependent upon an accurate diagnosis of the problem. Environmental protection laws should not be made the scapegoat
for lagging domestic energy production. Nothing warrants the assumption
that environmental laws are primarily responsible for the energy crisis
faced by the nation, nor the belief that an elimination of such laws will
rescue the country from its current crisis.
The EMB experience also underscores the hazards of drafting energyenvironmental legislation which is incapable -of delivering its promised
benefits. The EMB proposal was designed to eliminate delays in the permitting of selected energy projects and thereby reduce the time required
to bring energy projects on line. 67 A major conceptual weakness of the
proposal, however, was the single focus upon permit requirements as a
method to expedite the process. Other major factors which contribute to
delay in the siting phase of an energy project were unaffected by the proposal. 68 Absent the assurance that the EMB could have expedited energy
facility siting, the proposal compromised the ability of the siting process
to address environmental concerns in exchange for a dubious promise of
more energy.
IV. PROPOSAL
A fundamental lesson to be drawn from the proposal of fast-track siting
is a recognition of the limitations of the siting process as a means to stimulate domestic energy production. The primary limitation on any modifiof agencies stated that the environmental analysis and decisions made by various agency personnel
have significantly improved environmental planning and management." Id. at 26. See also GENERAL
AccouNTING OFFICa, supra note 63, at 34-37 (Some projects have been modified for environmental
reasons because of the impact statement process; the increasing agency and public awareness of environmental statements led to better planning decisions on later projects. Notably, the costs of preparing an EIS have been minor, averaging approximately one-tenth of one percent of project costs.);
Hamilton, supranote 60, at 91.

65.

37 CONG. Q. 2136 (1979).

66. Id.
67. "The proposal before us would create a strong EMB, one that would cut through the bureaucracy and dramatically reduce the time required to bring vital energy projects on line." 125 CONG.
REc. S13,858 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1979) (remarks of Sen. Jackson).
68. For example, the EMB would have been powerless in the face of labor disputes. See H.R.
4985, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 186(b)(1)(A), 125 CONG. REc. H9996 (daily ed. Oct. 31, 1979).
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cation of current siting procedures is the necessity of preserving public
confidence in the process. 69 In this regard, the EMB proposal was admirable in that it sought to coordinate the numerous siting requirements and
reduce the uncertainties and the administrative redundancies inherent in a
fragmented process. The decision to extend waiver authority to the EMB,
however, threatened to skew the process in favor of energy values.70 The
ability to eliminate permit requirements was particularly unjustified in the
absence of evidence that such requirements were either expendable or the
major source of delay. 71 The proper focus of attempts to streamline the
process should be coordination. Increased coordination would lend certainty to the process and reduce any existing agency overlaps without
overlooking concerns embodied in current siting requirements.
In the event that the Reagan Administration includes in its energy program a plan for the modification of current power plant siting procedures,
a sensible and environmentally responsible alternative would be establishing a federal one-stop procedure. 72 Unlike the EMB approach which
attacked the substance of environmental regulations in an attempt to expedite the process, the one-stop concept expedites the permitting process by
coordinating existing laws.73 In addition, one-stop siting reforms promise
to yield more long-term benefits than the fast-track approach which only
provides an alternative siting procedure for a limited number of selected
energy projects. 74 A one-stop policy would enable the energy industry to
gain a measure of certainty in the permitting process with timely deci-

69. Any change in the decision-making process which results in a reduction of public respect and
confidence in the process will increase the number of decisions challenged in court and consequently
negate any potential efficiency benefits from the modification. Hearingson S. 1684, S. 1915, and S.
3631 Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 268 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
Senate Commerce Comm. Hearings] (statement of Robert Rauch, Assistant Legislative Director,
Friends of the Earth); Hearingson H.R. 5277, H.R. 6970, H.R. 6971, H.R. 6972, H.R. 3838, H.R.
7045, H.R. 1079, and H.R. 1486 Before the Subcomm. on Communicationsand Power of the House
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 238 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
Communications and Power Subcomm. Hearings] (testimony of Rogers C.B. Morton, Secretary of
the Interior).
70. See notes 54-58 and accompanying text supra.
71. See notes 61-66 and accompanying text supra.
72. In 1971, the Nixon Administration introduced legislation proposing the establishment of
state or regional one-stop agencies for the certification of major electric generating and transmission
facilities. H.R. 5277, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 117 CONG. REc. 4374 (1971). The bill died in committee. See generally Case & Shoenbrod, supra note 11, at 1001-04; Tarlock, Tippy & Francis, supra
note 11, at 553-59. Any new legislation should follow the EMB's lead and attempt to address all
non-nuclear energy resources as a unified topic, rather than fragmenting consideration of the different
sources of energy. See Case & Schoenbrod, supranote 11, at 1007.
73. See note 42 and accompanying text supra.
74. See note 30 and accompanying text supra.
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sions, yet preserve a confidence in the ability of the decision-making process to arrive at fair and balanced decisions.
A federal policy favoring one-stop siting could best be developed by
the creation of federal guidelines 75 requiring states to utilize the concept.
The one-stop concept should be implemented on the state level 76 since
state agencies are sufficiently close to the communities affected by a proposed site to be responsive to local concerns. At the same time, they are
sufficiently removed so that the local concerns do not override broader
public interests. 77 The lodging of one-stop siting responsibilities with
state governments is also preferable because it avoids a potential constitutional states' rights issue 78 and, of particular appeal to the Reagan Administration, it avoids the creation of a new federal bureaucracy.
Implementation would require the designation of an existing neutral
75. Guidelines could include the establishment of:
1) requirements with respect to both the issues and the data to be included in long range plans;
2) criteria for evaluating the environmental impact of a proposed site;
3) criteria for evaluating the environmental impact of alternative sites;
4) procedures to ensure early public participation in the planning and certification stages;
5) procedures and requirements with respect to the formation of state one-stop agencies and their
powers;
6) procedures to ensure consideration of regional impacts; and
7) requirements with respect to adequate staffing of the state one-stop agencies.
76. Because energy needs and environmental impacts associated with a project may extend beyond the boundaries of the state in which it is located, adjacent states which may be affected by the
project should be granted standing to participate in the review and certification proceedings of the
state in which the project is located. Federal hydroelectric power plants which encompass several
states would remain under the coverage of the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 791-828 (1976).
77. Communications and Power Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 69, at 240 (testimony of Rogers C. B. Morton, Secretary of the Interior). See also id. at 299-315 (statement of Gordon J. F.
McDonald, Council on Environmental Quality); id. at 858-61 (testimony of John G. Quale, President, Wis. Electric Power Co.). One state initiative in response to the proposed override of state and
local laws by the EMB has been Colorado's Joint Review Process (JRP). Designed as a method to
retain state control over energy resources, the JRP Draft Manual proclaims that JRP is not a new
siting procedure, but a management system drafted to increase efficiency between the three levels of
government. Similar to the fast-track approach, JRP would be available only to a limited number of
projects. See generally COLORADO DEPT OF NATURAL REsouRcEs, supra note 16. Approximately 20
states have expressed an interest in the state level reform model created by Colorado. Status Report
No. 12, Status of the Colorado Joint Review Progress Program 3 (Feb. 1981).
78. The states' rights issue would be raised in the context of a federal agency making decisions
involving traditional generic state governmental functions such as zoning decisions, land-use controls, and safety regulations as they are applicable to energy facilities. In addition, given the opposition encountered by the EMB on states' rights grounds, it is doubtful that a new federal bureaucracy
that impinges upon state authority would be passed by Congress. See Library of Congress Congressional Research Service, Constitutional Analysis of Energy Mobilization Proposals (July 31, 1979);
Department of Justice, Memorandum: Constitutionality of the Energy Mobilization Board Proposal
(July 24, 1979), reprintedin 125 CoNo. REc. S 13,884-87 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1979); Fischer, Allocating Decisionmakingin the Fieldof Energy ResourceDevelopment: Some Questions andSuggestions,
22 Apiz. L. REv. 785 (1980).
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federal agency 79 to develop federal guidelines for state compliance. The
guidelines should provide flexibility for states to adapt the one-stop concept to their particular needs. 80 Methods to ensure compliance by the
states could be modeled after the 1971 federal one-stop proposal. 8 1 The
federal government could preempt the field and conditionally delegate the
preempted siting authority back to the states.
The sine qua non of one-stop siting is the creation of a certifying
agency 82 and the utilization of a single master application. 83 Federal
guidelines would require the creation of a new state siting agency, or the
adaptation of an existing siting agency, with final authority on all state
siting issues. To assure public confidence in the process, the guidelines
should require the adoption of procedural safeguards, such as provisions
for independent consultants to gather the requisite siting data, and a publicly funded counsel representing the environment. 84 The certifying
agency should operate as a coordinating mechanism allowing separate
agencies with demonstrated competence in various fields to retain their
85
input into the process.
An important improvement in the siting process would be the incorporation of a mandatory extended planning horizon. 86 Long-range open
planning with a periodic review by federal agencies should diminish the
often unchecked power the energy industry exercises in their formulation
79. See, e.g., H.R. 5277, 92d Cong., Ist Sess., 117 CONG. REC. 4374 (1971). H.R. 5277 allowed the President to designate a Federal Certifying Agency. President Nixon planned to designate
the proposed Department of Natural Resources or the existing Department of the Interior as the Federal Certifying Agency. See Communications and Power Subcomm. Hearings,supra note 69, at 240
(testimony of Rogers C.B. Morton, Secretary of the Interior).
80. Communications and Power Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 69, at 299-315 (testimony of
Gordon J. F. McDonald, Council on Environmental Quality).
81. Id. at 696-713 (statement of William R. Gould, Senior Vice-President, Southern California
Edison Co.; Chairman, Western Systems Coordinating Council).
82. See notes 37-38 and accompanying text supra.
83. See note 38 and accompanying text supra.
84. See note 46 and accompanying text supra.
85. See note 42 and accompanying text supra.
86. See, e.g., H.R. 5277, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(a), 117 CONG. REC. 4374 (1971). H.R. 5277
required the electric utilities to reveal the general location, size, and type of bulk power supply facilities over a ten-year planning horizon. A preliminary review of alternative energy facility sites would
occur five years in advance of construction. Id. § 8(c), 117 CONG. REC. 4374 (1971). See also Senate
Commerce Comm. Hearings, supra note 69, at 142 (testimony of Michael McCloskey, Executive
Director, Sierra Club); id. at 225 (testimony of Gordon J. F. McDonald, Council on Environmental
Quality); Communications and Power Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 69, at 238 (testimony of Rogers C. B. Morton, Secretary of the Interior).
As an example of a state statute, see the Warren-Alquist State Energy Resources Conservation and
Development Act, CAL. PUB. Res. CODE §§ 25000-25007 (West Supp. 1981). The Act requires that
the California Energy Commission engage in comprehensive planning and forecasting activities. The
process has three components. The first stage is an evaluation of: (1) the extent that new facilities are
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of energy project proposals. 87 The public availability of information combined with early participation by the public should facilitate the development of a consensus on the need of any project which ultimately reaches
the siting phase. 88 Current procedures are frequently marked by an adversarial character because of the energy industry's desire to protect the financial investment required in order for a proposal merely to reach the
siting application stage. The preliminary identification of sites and early
hearings would ensure a full ventilation of issues before the time when the
immediate energy needs of a community must prevail.
The comparison of the fast-track model with the one-stop model points
out several features which should be avoided in drafting one-stop legislation. The power of waiver is unnecessary and should not be given to the
siting council. Also, if the new administration wishes to use timetables as
a means of encouraging expeditious decisiong, it is important that a data
requirement accompany any time requirement placed upon the agencies.
A data requirement should ensure that quality decisions will not be sacrificed in the name of speed. Finally, a vital, but sometimes overlooked,
consideration is to ensure that the siting council is adequately staffed so
that it may effectively carry out its responsibilities. 89
V.

CONCLUSION

The nation's policymakers have chosen two confliciting goals-protecting the environment and satisfying the nation's energy needs. The decision to allow the construction of a major energy facility requires a compromise between these conflicting goals. Legal commentators and energy
industry representatives agree that the decision-making process that
forges the energy-environment compromise needs streamlining. Two pro-

needed, (2) the extent that proposed facilities are acceptable, (3) whether there are better alternatives,
and (4) whether there are acceptable sites for the available technologies. The second stage requires an
evaluation of the appropriateness of the utility's proposal in concept. The third stage involves a detailed critique of the specific proposal by the Commission staff and agencies for completeness. See
generally CALIFORNIA ENERGY COMMISSION, POWER PLANT SITING POLICY PAPER (1978).
87. See note 60 and accompanying text supra. See also Senate Commerce Comm. Hearings,
supra note 69, at 139-44 (statement of Michael McCloskey, Executive Director, Sierra Club). Review and comment responsibilities should be undertaken by several agencies. Those agencies could
include: the designated Federal Certifying Agency, the Council on Environmental Quality, the Army
Corps of Engineers, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, and the state one-stop agency.
88. See note 62 supra. In light of recent energy demand studies which have readjusted downward
energy need forecasts, it may be increasingly difficult to develop a consensus on the need for a new
energy facility. Early public participation in the planning process, therefore, will be of particular
importance in developing a consensus in the coming years. See note 6 supra.
89. See Granger & Wise, supranote 35, at 479-80.
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posed schemes exist for streamlining major energy facility siting decisions. The first proposal is fast-track siting, which creates an agency to
accelerate the development of domestic energy resources. The second is
one-stop siting, which creates a siting agency to decide all issues relating
to the construction and operation of an energy facility. A one-stop agency
is preferable because it creates a single forum for rational, efficient, and
comprehensive siting decisions. The fast-track approach, on the other
hand, is premised on several questionable assumptions about our current
energy dilemma. In addition, the fast-track approach is not comprehensive and its inherent bias favoring energy facility construction skews the
balancing process to the detriment of environmental interests.
CharlesR. Ching

486

